The problem with red lines
by David Atkins
The Obama Administration's policy on Syria has largely been one of caution and reticence to engage. However, the President did make clear that any sign of chemical attacks by Assad's regime against his own people would be a bright "red line" necessitating a belligerent response.
There's no absolute proof yet that the regime has crossed that line, but the evidence seems to suggest that there was indeed a major chemical attack on a rebel population. UN Inspector General Ban Ki Moon is intoning "serious consequences" if there is proof that Assad did use chemical weapons on his people.
But what exactly is the international community prepared to do? It would be reckless and counterproductive at this point for the United States to start lobbing bombs into Syria. A massive UN peacekeeping force might be in order, but the architecture of the Security Council is such that Russia and China will never agree to such a move even under the best of circumstances. Moreover, the time for a UN peacekeeping mission in Syria was long ago: at this point, the genie of retributive violence will be almost impossible to put back in the bottle even if the UN had the capacity and political will to send in forces.
Yet the red line has been crossed, and both nation-state leaders and international leaders cannot afford to lose face and have their bluff called, or dozens of murderous dictators will be emboldened further to act against their own people without fear of retribution.
It's not an easy problem to solve, but it seems that one of two things should be done: either the responsible nations of the world must work much more effectively to give the UN teeth to respond when red lines are crossed, or they shouldn't be issuing red line ultimatums at all.
Causing even greater, even more futile violence just to save face is the worst of all options.
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